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Abstract1 
Designing a resource strategy for logistics support includes choosing to use 
contracted, blended, or organic support, or a combination thereof, for acquisition 
products. Non-cost issues have received much less attention than cost in resource 
strategy design—even though policy requires the incorporation of many non-cost 
issues. This lack of attention is partially due to the large number of issues that can 
impact strategy design, the diversity of issue features and impacts, and the diversity 
of characteristics of programs, their environments, and potential strategies. Although 
many issues that should be included in logistic planning have been identified, little 
guidance is provided for how program management teams can incorporate them into 
logistics support resource strategy design. Tools that facilitate describing logistics 
requirements and the impacts of resource strategies on program success can 
potentially improve resource strategy design, assessment, and documentation for 
review. The structure and use of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map for 
helping program management teams consider a broad range of logistics support 
resource strategy design issues are described. An example application illustrates the 
Map’s use. Implications for practice and potential future developments tool are 
discussed.  
Keywords: Logistic support, resource strategy, strategy design and 
assessment 
 
                                            
1 The Logistic Support Resource Strategy Map and the example application described in this report 
are shown at Appendix B and C, and are digitally available from the first author at no cost. 
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Introduction 
“‘[The] logistic process is at once the military element in the nation’s economy and 
the economic element in its military operation.’ […] Logistical conditions and 
capabilities largely determined what was strategically available and tactically feasible 
[…] logistics is always the indispensible servant of victory, and ‘like any indispensible 
servant, it is frequently the master’” (S. B. Duncan, as cited in Rose, 2006, p. 191) 
The ability to provide effective and efficient logistics support for deployed 
military systems is a critical part of successful program management. At least two 
important questions must be addressed to meet this acquisition goal:  
1) What types of resources will be used to provide what logistics support? 
i.e. What is the logistic support resource strategy?  
2) Given the logistics support resource strategy selected, how can 
logistics operations be managed to maximize effectiveness and 
efficiency?  
The Department of Defense has addressed logistics operations (the second 
question) at length. Logistics support operations can be assessed by both their 
effectiveness in meeting requirements and their efficiency of use of funds. 
Performance of logistics support operations in meeting requirements is measured 
with metrics such as the average response time and other metrics developed 
through Performance-based Logistics (PBL). These metrics are used to assess the 
effectiveness of logistics operations. Costs—including monies paid to contracted 
logistics support providers, government expenses incurred to contract and manage 
those providers, and funds for organic logistics support—are used with performance 
measures to assess the efficiency of the use of funds (Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), 2005). 
 
In contrast, logistics support resource strategy design (the first question) has 
received much less attention beyond the preference for the cheapest alternative. As 
used here, a logistics support resource strategy describes the sources (contracted, 
organic, or blended) of support provided to meet different logistics support 
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requirements. However, a DoD program’s logistics support resource strategy is 
important because it profoundly impacts total program performance. Figure 1 
describes the relative costs in a product’s lifecycle. As shown, operations and 
logistics costs are large when compared to Research and Development, Investment, 
and Disposal costs. Therefore, the effective and efficient design of a program’s 
logistics support resource strategy is critical to overall program success.  
 
Figure 1. Relative Costs during a Product Lifecycle  
(DAU, 2004, November, p. 43) 
 
Most naval logistics support is provided by two types of resources: 
commercial organizations that contract with the government to provide material, 
equipment and services (a.k.a., Contractor Logistics Support, CLS) and internal 
military resources that provide the same material, equipment, and services. These 
are referred to as “contracted” and “organic” forms of logistics support, respectively. 
Three logistics support resourcing strategies are commonly considered: 1) 
contracting for all logistics support, 2) providing all logistics support with organic 
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resources, and 3) providing some support through contracts and the remainder of 
support from organic resources, referred to as a “blended” strategy.  
The three strategies are very different from one another in their 
characteristics, challenges for the government, and risks. The decision to provide 
support entirely with contracted resources (CLS) is an outsourcing strategy that 
often requires significant government contracting effort; it also requires contract 
management expertise and experience on both the government and contractor sides 
of the agreement. Contracted logistics introduce challenges to the government that 
include reduced control of resources and increased sensitivity to the goals of private 
enterprises. In contrast, by providing all logistics support with organic resources, 
program managers apply a “make” (versus “buy”) approach to providing logistics. 
Organic logistics support (OLS) presents challenges of developing and retaining 
adequate expertise, building the infrastructure of diagnostics, spares, maintenance 
facilities, etc.; such support also can increase resource allocation risks . Different 
again is a blended strategy, which can be a disaggregation of meeting the same 
support requirements between contracted and organic resources, an interdependent 
allocation of different types of support among different resources, or a combination 
of the two. Blended logistics resource support strategies bring with them the 
challenges of comparison between contracted and organic performance and 
operational interface management. These differences make forecasting the impacts 
of specific logistics support resource strategies and logistics support performance 
and cost very difficult. This inability to forecast, in turn, makes logistics support 
resource strategy design difficult.  
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Problem Description  
The logistical features and characteristics of programs and their environments 
vary widely. Some impacts on resource strategy design (i.e., the use of CLS, 
blended, and OLS) can be described and assessed in monetary terms, such as 
differences in labor costs between contracted and organic personnel. Other aspects 
may have significant impacts but are intangible, such as reductions in commitment 
or morale of contracted suppliers due to many large rapid changes in government 
needs or the introduction of a more lucrative opportunity for using their resources. 
Many potentially important aspects lie between these two extremes.  
Logistics support resource strategies also vary widely. This diversity is 
partially due to differing abilities of resources to fulfill different logistics requirements. 
For example, the contractor that develops a critical technology for a new weapons 
system may be the only organization capable of providing its logistics support. If 
logistics support is viewed as a single, monolithic set of requirements, then a 
resource strategy can be described by specifying the resources that fulfill sets of 
requirements. But different logistics support requirements can often be better met by 
different support resources. Therefore, total logistics support is often disaggregated 
into sets of requirements—each potentially with a different logistics support resource 
strategy or design.  
The disaggregation of logistics support can be based on technical knowledge, 
workforce characteristics, and legal and ownership issues. Contractors may own 
specific product knowledge, software, facilities, or technical data that are required to 
provide logistics support, or may have access to necessary or preferred business 
relationships (e.g., supply chains of critical components). Legal (often proprietary) 
constraints or extraordinarily high prices for access may require some logistics 
support requirements to be clustered for supply by specific firms. Clustering based 
on this third criterion is typically contractor-specific. Therefore, good logistics support 
resource strategy design includes an analysis of how clustering support 
requirements for resourcing can impact the attractiveness of specific strategies. 
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Due to the uniqueness of programs, environments, and strategies, no one 
logistics support resource strategy is always best for all programs. Each strategy has 
a different set of features and characteristics that provide different advantages and 
disadvantages relative to other strategies. Those advantages and disadvantages 
generate benefits and costs. For example, the contracted logistics support 
organization may have developed a piece of equipment that is unique to the system 
being supported and, therefore, would have an intimate knowledge of its design and 
manufacturing. This provides special expertise in system maintenance and repair 
that are not available organically. That expertise may reduce repair times, costs, or 
both. Likewise, organic resources may be fully dedicated to the program and 
available with zero notice. This allows the organic resources to respond faster to 
unexpected increases in demands for logistics support, which could reduce 
response times experienced by warfighters. An example of this type of advantage of 
organic support is found in Coryell’s (2004) case study of logistics support for the 
Army’s Stryker program in which a change in logistics support resource strategy was 
driven by the flexibility provided by organic resources. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that contracted, blended, and organic strategies each provide a broad and diverse 
spectrum of advantages and disadvantages. However, selecting the best logistics 
support resource strategy for a specific program is difficult because of the need to 
identify the important features and characteristics of the program, its environment, 
and potential strategies and to assess their impacts on logistics support resource 
strategy selection. Given this multitude of potential drivers of and influences on 
logistics support, how can acquisition program managers select the best 
logistics support resource strategy for a specific program?  
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DoD Policies Regarding Logistics Support 
Resource Strategy   
Basic DoD logistics policy, as described in the Acquisition Logistics Guide 
(Defense Systems Management College, 1997) suggests six comparison criteria 
when performing tradeoff studies among alternative system designs and logistics 
support strategies (pp. 8-10): 
 Lifecycle cost comparisons, 
 Diagnostic characteristics (e.g., Built-in-Test (BIT)), 
 Energy characteristics, 
 Battle damage repair characteristics, 
 Transportability characteristics, and 
 Facilities requirements. 
As this list indicates, cost and measurable logistic performance metrics have 
predominated logistics support resource strategy selection policy. The Guide (pp. 8-
11) also suggests nine supportability issues for use in logistics strategy design:   
 Operations and maintenance personnel and staff-hour constraints, 
 Personnel skill-level constraints, 
 Lifecycle and Operations and Support (O&S) cost constraints, 
 Target percentages of system failures correctable at each 
maintenance level, 
 Mean down time in the operational environment, 
 Turn-around time in the operational environment, 
 Standardization and interoperability requirements, 
 Built-in fault-isolation capability, and 
 Transportability requirements (identification of conveyances on which 
the system and its components are transportable). 
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Only two of the nine (personnel skill-level constraints and operations and 
maintenance personnel and staff-hour constraints) reach beyond cost and logistic 
operations metrics. Acquisition procedures as specified in DoD 5000.2-R also 
emphasizes cost in assessing logistics strategies, saying “Life-cycle costs [...] shall 
play a key role in the overall [logistics support concept] selection process” (p.90).  
While cost and logistic operations performance should and will remain a 
centerpiece of logistics support analysis, more recent DoD policy has shifted to 
increase the importance of other criteria in logistics support resource strategy 
design. The Acting USD (AT&L) has promulgated the Performance-based Logistics 
(PBL) approach (2004, January 23). Later that same year, the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L) established the following high-level performance metrics for 
Performance-based Logistics (2004, August 16):   
 Operational Availability, 
 Operational Reliability, 
 Cost per Unit Usage, 
 Logistics Footprint, and 
 Logistics Response Time. 
Only one of these high-level performance metrics (Cost per Unit Usage) is 
cost based. The other four metrics address readiness (availability, reliability, and 
response time) and impacts of logistics (footprint). This clearly shows the importance 
of integrating non-cost logistics support issues into logistics support design, 
including resource strategy.  
The Performance-based Logistics guidelines (DAU, 2005) also leave no 
doubt about the importance of non-cost factors in selecting a logistics support 
resource strategy. The Business Case Analysis requires: 
Consideration of performance and cost risk will explicitly consider contract 
versus organic risk management, financial accountability, and recovery 
actions. The risk assessment should address the probability and confidence 
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level of the following events: poor performance, cost growth, extended labor 
disputes, and changeover in PSI / PSP.  (p. 3-30) 
The guidelines explicitly describe the resource strategy addressed in the 
current work as an important logistics support design decision (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. An Illustration of the Role of Logistics Resource Strategy in 
Performance-based Logistics  
(DAU, 2005, p. 2-3) 
Coryell’s (2004) case study of logistic support in the Army’s Stryker program 
demonstrates the role of non-cost factors in logistic support resource strategy design 
in implementing the PBL policy. A cost analysis was performed, suggesting the use 
of purely organic support (Figure 3). However, a different, non-cost issue drove the 
logistic support resource strategy design. Specifically, the design shifted from a 
primarily contracted strategy to a more blended strategy based on the differences in 
the flexibility of logistic support that could be provided by organic and contracted 
resources.  
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Figure 3. Cost Analysis Results of Stryker Logistic  
Support Resource Strategies  
(Coryell, 2004, p. 63, Figure 15) 
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Logistics Support Strategy Improvement Efforts 
Several evaluations of DoD logistics support resource strategies have 
identified areas for improvement. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
found little data had been collected that could verify the cost effectiveness of 
logistics strategies (2002). The same report expressed concern over several aspects 
of logistics support, including:   
 Ability to develop and maintain critical technical skills and knowledge, 
 Deployment of contractors to the battlefield and how protecting and 
supporting these contractors may affect their troops’ ability to 
accomplish their missions, 
 Ability to shift funds in response to changing conditions, and 
 Availability of affordable technical data to develop additional or new 
sources of repair and maintenance to ensure a competitive market. 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL) is a major DoD effort to improve logistics 
support, including resource strategies. PBL explicitly addresses the resourcing 
issue. 
The Business Case Analysis (BCA) portion of PBL is particularly relevant to 
the current work. The PBL guide (DAU, 2005) describes the BCA as “an expanded 
cost/benefit analysis created with the intent of determining a best-value solution for 
product support” (p. 3-27). The analysis includes much more than traditional 
economic factors such as cost, including:   
 Performance measures,  
 Capitalization/asset ownership,  
 Size of footprint, 
 Reliability growth, 
 Lifecycle costs, 
 Diminished manufacturing sources management, 
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 Obsolescence/Obsolescence mitigation plan, 
 Technology insertion, 
 Risk management, 
 Minimum and maximum essential logistics capabilities (peacetime to 
full mobilization requirement), 
 Existing infrastructure, 
 Common consumables support, 
 Reliability and maintainability forecasts at the major system,  
 Supply chain responsiveness, and 
 Surge capabilities. 
Notice here the shift from a focus on cost (“expanded cost/benefit analysis”) 
to indentifying the broader “best-value solution.” The factors to be considered 
include many that are difficult or impossible to measure in monetary terms (surge 
capabilities) or even quantify (e.g., Technology insertion). The PBL BCA provides a 
useful enumeration of some of the non-cost factors that should be considered in 
logistics support resource strategy design. However, the guidelines provide little 
assistance about how to incorporate those factors into logistics support resource 
strategy design. The next section describes a tool for this purpose.  
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A Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
As described, the features and characteristics of programs, their 
environments, and specific resource strategies vary widely, as do their impacts on 
logistics support. The qualitative nature of many important features and 
characteristics precludes the use of precise mathematical modeling for inclusion in 
logistics support resource strategy design. However, they can be structured in ways 
that facilitate objective assessment and inclusion in strategy design. Examples 
include the different types of flexibility that contracted, blended, and organic 
strategies provide programs. A useful tool for inclusive resource strategy design will 
identify and model both qualitative and quantitative features and characteristics and 
how they impact the attractiveness of different resourcing strategies. The 
incorporation of qualitative factors in strategy assessment can improve strategy 
selection by prompting decision-makers to use these factors in decision-making. It is 
important to note that the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map does not 
replace critical thinking or analysis by the program management team, but can 
facilitate that thinking and analysis to improve logistics support resource 
strategy design.  
An Excel®-based Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map (Map) at 
Appendix B, has been developed to facilitate logistics support resource strategy 
design. The Map facilitates five aspects of designing a logistics support resources 
strategy for a specific set of requirements:  
• Identifying and describing logistics support resource strategy criteria that are 
relevant for meeting specific logistics support requirements; 
• Quantifying the relative importance of logistics support resource strategy 
criteria to meeting specific requirements or sets of requirements; 
• Qualitative assessment of the degree to which the program and strategy (as 
they relate to the requirements) favor the use of organic resources, 
contracted resources, or a blend of organic and contracted resources; 
• The quantification of the support for the use of contracted, blended, or organic 
resources to meet specific criteria and the aggregation of that support for sets 
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of criteria for specific requirements; this can facilitate the grouping of 
requirements for logistics support acquisition.   
• The aggregation of priority-weighted support across criteria for comparison of 
different program strategies; and  
• Documentation and support of logistics support resource strategy decisions 
for use in program reviews.  
The sorting function in Excel® allows the reorganization of the criteria 
considered to facilitate team discussion and strategy assessment. For example, 
criteria can be sorted by those that apply to a particular logistics support 
requirement, by the type of criteria, or in descending order from those most 
supported by contracted resourcing to those least supported by contracted 
resourcing (Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Partial Screenshot of Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
In addition, the Map facilitates the documentation of the strategy modeling. 
Each row in a Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map represents a specific 
criterion that may be used to assess a resource strategy to meet one or more 
support requirements. Each column of the Map describes a characteristic of the 
criteria, as follows:   
 - 15 - 
 Importance of Criterion, 
 Logistic Support Resource Strategy Criterion, 
 Criterion Type, 
 Logistic Support Requirement, 
 Degree of Program & Strategy Support,  
 Reasoning behind Assessment, 
 Locations of Supporting Information, 
 Degree of Support for Contracted Logistics Support, 
 Priority-weighted Degree of Support for Contracted Logistic Support, 
and 
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Components of a Logistics Support Resource 
Strategy Map 
Importance of Criterion (Column B in the spreadsheet): This value is the 
quantified assessment of the relative importance of specific criteria in meeting the 
requirement named in Column E in the spreadsheet. Consistent with ranking criteria 
from the most to least important, smaller values indicate more important criteria. 
Duplicate use of the same importance value and fractional values are 
accommodated, but values less than one are to be avoided (see “Priority-weighted 
Degree of Support for CLS” below). All criteria are initially assessed to have 
essentially no importance (value = 99). This forces the program team to identify and 
select criteria to be used in assessment by assigning them a smaller importance 
value. Criteria that are not selected (i.e., value remains 99) are ignored in the 
quantitative assessments.   
Logistics Support Resource Strategy Criterion (Column C in the 
spreadsheet): In this Map, 51 potential criteria are provided in 8 categories. These 
suggested criteria were developed based on a review of civilian and military logistics 
support literature. For example, Fine and Whitney (1996) group the reasons to make 
(organic support) or buy (contracted support) into issues of capacity and knowledge. 
They go on to discuss the roles of several factors in the make-buy (organic versus 
contracted) decision for product support—including the ability of a buyer to provide 
the support needed (more supports organic), relative costs, the quality of system 
performance, the criticality of the product to organizational success (more supports 
organic), the availability of qualified suppliers, product complexity, skill of suppliers, 
competitive advantages of suppliers, profit for suppliers. Parmigiani (2007) 
investigates the impact of product specificity (which would increase with product 
maturity) on firms’ tendency to outsource; her findings suggest increased maturity 
increases blended support over outsourcing and increases organic support over 
blended strategies. Military research also provided the basis for potential criteria. For 
example, Wild (2006) discusses the roles of direct (logistic operations) costs, indirect 
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(logistic supervision and management) costs, transaction (contracting) costs, control 
(e.g., responsiveness), economies of scale (e.g., fleet size), internal capabilities, 
profits and competitive advantages (e.g., bargaining power), coordination of the 
value chain, and information and property rights in outsourcing by the DoD. Several 
of the criteria suggested by the literature were investigated by others in more depth 
to assess their applicability to DoD acquisition. For example, Coryell (2004) performs 
a case study of the shift from predominantly CLS to a more blended logistics support 
strategy in the Army’s Stryker program. He concludes (p. 61) that the primary reason 
for the change was not cost, but the need for more flexibility in combat operations.      
In the Logistic Support Resource Strategy Map all criteria are worded so that 
the more the criterion is met or is true, the stronger support is provided for an 
organic logistics support resource strategy. Criteria descriptions can be changed and 
customized to fit program needs; five spaces for new criteria are also provided. For 
example, one criterion that reflects logistics support costs is “CLS unit cost to 
provide logistics support operations.” A very high value for this criterion (i.e. CLS 
costs are very high) supports the use of organic logistics support resources. The 
opposite is also true. The less the criterion is met (i.e., CLS costs are low), the more 
the criterion supports the use of contracted logistics support resources.   
Criterion Type (Column D in the spreadsheet): Criteria are categorized as 
being one of eight types:  
 Business relations, 
 Cost, 
 Funding, 
 Information and technology, 
 Labor resources, 
 Logistics operations performance, 
 Product characteristics, 
 Program characteristics, and 
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 Program environments. 
All criteria of a given type can be grouped to facilitate discussion and 
assessment by sorting.   
Logistics Support Requirement (Column E in the spreadsheet):  This cell 
for each criterion can be used to specify which logistics support requirements are 
being addressed with the strategy being assessed. This may be useful when a 
logistics support resource strategy is being assessed that has different requirements 
that may be addressed with different criteria. Requirement descriptions can be 
changed as needed to reflect program and strategy characteristics.   
Degree of Program and Strategy Support (Columns F through P in the 
spreadsheet): The Map provides 11 possible degrees of program and strategy 
support for the use of organic support to meet requirements from “Very high,” which 
supports the use of organic resources, to “Very low,” which supports the use of 
contracted resources. All criteria are worded so that the more or better organic 
logistics support fills the criteria, the higher the assessment that is given (see 
“Logistics Support Resource Strategy Criterion” above). Therefore, an 
assessment of “Very High” indicates that using only organic resource strategy can 
meet the criterion very well; an assessment of “Very Low” indicates that using only 
contracted resource strategy can meet the criterion very well; and assessments 
between these extremes indicate the ability of various amounts of blended strategy 
to meet the criterion best. The degree of support that the strategy provides for filling 
the criteria with organic resources is indicated by inserting an “X” in the cell that 
represents the level of support.    
Reasoning behind the Assessment (Column Q in the spreadsheet):  Space 
is provided to document the basis for the assessed degree of support provided by 
the strategy to meet the criteria.  
Locations of Supporting Information (Column R in the spreadsheet):  
Space is provided to document the location of information that supports the 
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assessed degree of support provided by the strategy to meet the criteria with organic 
resources.  
Degree of Support for CLS (Column S in the spreadsheet):  The Map 
quantifies the assessed degree of support provided by the program and strategy to 
meet the criteria with organic, blended, or contracted resources into integer values 
from 0 to 10; these reflect the degree of support for contracted resources, with 0 
reflecting little support for contracted resources (i.e., strong support for organic 
resources) and 10 representing strong support for contracted resources. The 
juxtaposition from increasing qualitative assessment supporting organic resources to 
increasing quantified support supporting contracted resources (i.e. “Very High” 
support for organic is assigned the lowest numerical value and vice versa) is 
purposeful and intended to assist the assessment team in adopting multiple 
perspectives for improved assessment and logistics support resource strategy 
planning.   
Priority-weighted Degree of Support for CLS (Column T in the 
spreadsheet):  The Map integrates the assessed importance of the criteria and 
degree of support into a priority-weighted degree of support for the use of contracted 
resources. Values range from 0 to 10 if the recommendations for assessing each 
criterion’s importance described above are used,2 with large values reflecting 
important criteria that strongly support the use of contracted resources and vice 
versa (less importance, less support for CLS, or both). These values are generated 
by dividing the degree of support (range = {0,10}) by the importance of the criteria 
(range = {1,98}). As an example, if a strategy of contracting all logistics support to a 
new contractor was being assessed, if the criterion “Risks associated with a new 
CLS contractor” were considered the most important criterion (Importance of Criteria 
= 1) and the risks were considered to be very low (“X” in “Very Low” cell, column P), 
                                            
2 Assessments of criteria importance less than one generate Priority-weighted Degree of Support for 
CLS values that do not accurately reflect the relative positions of criteria due to division by very small 
values.   
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then the Priority-weighted Degree of Support for CLS would be 10 (= 10/1). In 
contrast, if the assessments for the same criterion for the same strategy were that 
the criterion was ranked third among criteria (Importance of Criterion = 3), and the 
risk was assessed to be between that for a balanced blended strategy and a 
contracted strategy (e.g., 8, “X” in column N) then the Priority-weighted Degree of 
Support for CLS would be 2.67 (=8/3). Note that the Priority-weighted Degree of 
Support for CLS directly (linearly) reflects the assessments of criteria importance 
and the strategies support of organic, blended, or contracted support. Values, or 
differences in values, are directly proportional to those assessments. For example, 
the change from a value of 10 to a value of 2.67 in the example above is the product 
of the reduction in the importance (8/10) and the support degree (1/3). Users of the 
Map should not read more meaning or validity into these values than their underlying 
structure suggest.   
Cumulative Degree of Support for CLS (Column U in the spreadsheet).  
The Map aggregates the Priority-weighted degrees of Support for CLS into a single 
quantitative value that represents the strategy’s overall support for CLS. This single 
value can be useful in comparing different logistics support resource strategies. This 
value is the sum of the Priority-weighted degrees of support for CLS for all criteria 
used for strategy assessment (importance < 99) divided by 10.3 Possible values 
range from zero to the number of significant criteria. Note that, ceteris paribus (all 
else equal), a strategy that uses more criteria will have a larger Cumulative Degree 
of Support for CLS. Therefore, care must be taken in comparing strategies using the 
Cumulative Degree of Support for CLS to be sure that the strategy assessments use 
the same number of criteria.   
Application Process for the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map. 
The following steps can be used to describe and assess a set of logistics support 
requirements for resource strategy planning.  
                                            
3  The sum is divided by ten solely to keep maximum value equal to the number of criteria used for 
assessment.  
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Phase I: Create Criterion/Requirements Sets for Assessment 
1. Develop a rich description of the logistics support resource 
strategy to be assessed.  
2. Identify the logistics support requirements or sets of 
requirements to be supported by a single resource strategy. 
Group requirements into sets that must be or are planned to be 
supported with the same logistics support resource strategy.  
3. Identify the rows that describe criteria to be used for assessment 
for each requirement set. Use the criteria types and specific criteria 
suggested in the Map in columns C and D as a basis for discussing 
and indentifying criteria to be used to assess the resource strategy for 
each requirements set. Enter requirement set names or identifiers in 
the "Logistics Support Requirement(s)" column (E) of the rows of 
criteria to be used to assess each requirement set. Copy and insert 
entire rows of criteria needed for multiple requirement sets. Specify 
and add assessment criteria if required by altering criteria or entering 
additional criteria not listed into a row with a column C with the label 
"blank." To retain the Map’s ability to consistently quantify the 
characterization of a program and strategy on the criteria, describe the 
criteria so that more of the criteria supports the use of Organic 
Logistics Support.   
Phase II: Assess Criterion/Requirement Set Needs in Logistics 
Support Resources   
4. Assess and quantify the importance of each criterion. Sort the 
rows of assessments (“Assessments” range) by Logistics Support 
Requirement (Column E) to gather the criteria being used to assess 
the resource strategy for different requirement sets. For each 
criterion/requirement set (i.e., each row), enter a number in the 
"Importance of Criterion" column (B) that reflects the relative 
importance of the criterion relative to the other criteria for that 
requirement set. Although almost all values are allowed,4 it is 
suggested to restrict values to the range of 1 to 10—with 1 
representing the most important criteria, and 10 representing the least 
important criteria. The Map can use multiple uses of the same 
importance value for different criteria and fractional importance values 
as well as unique integer values, but values less than one are to be 
avoided (see “Priority-weighted Degree of Support for CLS”).    
                                            
4  The default value of 99 reflects criteria that are not used. Therefore, users must purposefully 
identify all criteria to be used by changing their importance value.  
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5. Qualitatively assess the support provided by different resource 
strategies. For each criterion/requirements set (i.e., each row), 
evaluate how well organic, blended, or contracted logistics support is 
expected to meet the criterion for the specified requirements set. State 
the assessment in terms of the ability of organic support to meet the 
criterion by answering the question, “Based on this criterion, how well 
do the program and proposed logistic support resource strategy 
support the use of organic logistics support?” with answers from “Very 
High” (which strongly supports the use of an organic strategy), 
“Balanced” (which suggests that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to both organic and contracted support), or “Very Low,” 
(which strongly suggests that a contracted resource strategy can meet 
the criteria much better than an organic strategy). For example, if the 
contracted developer of a product to be supported owns critical product 
information, the assessment for the criterion “Availability/affordability of 
technical data to the DoD” would be “Low” or “Very Low,” supporting 
the use of contracted resources (the developer in this case). Assess 
each criterion in isolation, as if it were the only criterion impacting the 
logistics support resource strategy design.   
6. Quantify support assessments. For each criterion/requirements set 
(i.e., each row), quantify assessments by entering the letter "X" in the 
appropriate box in Columns F through P. Assessments to the left 
(closer to “Very High”) indicate that an organic strategy outperforms a 
blended or contracted resource strategy for the specified criterion and 
requirements set. Use the letter “X” and only a single assessment for 
each criterion/requirement set if numerical estimates of support are 
desired. Upper and lower case “X”s are equivalent. Typing over 
existing text does not cause problems.  
7. Document assessments. For each criterion/requirements set (i.e., 
each row), add notes in the “Reasoning behind assessment” cell that 
explain the basis for the assessment. Likewise, enter references to 
data, reports, etc., in the “Locations of supporting information” cell as 
pointers to support for the assessment. 
Phase III: Review, Discuss, and Revise Assessments from 
Different Perspectives  
8. Review the most important criteria. Sort criterion/requirement sets 
by “Importance of Criterion” in ascending order (select "Assessments" 
range, then Data/Sort/Column B, Smallest to Largest, no headers) to 
view the criteria assessed to be most important in logistics support 
resource strategy design. Review, discuss, and revise as required to 
reflect criteria importance. For example, criteria reflecting legal 
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constraints that must be met should be assigned a small value (e.g., 
one).   
9. Review criteria that suggest support for Organic or Contracted 
Logistics Support . Sort criterion/requirement sets by "Degree of 
Support for CLS (0-10 scale)" in ascending order (select 
"Assessments" range, then Data/Sort/Column S, Smallest to Largest, 
no headers) to view the criterion/requirement sets that are most 
strongly supported by organic logistics support.5  Review, discuss, and 
revise as required. Sort criterion/requirement sets by "Degree of 
Support for CLS (0-10 scale)" in descending order (select 
"Assessments" range, then Data/Sort/Column S, Largest to Smallest, 
no headers) to view the criterion/requirement sets that are most 
strongly supported by contracted logistics support. Review, discuss, 
and revise as required.  
10. Review drivers of a contracted resource strategy. Sort 
criterion/requirement sets by "Priority-weighted degree of Support for 
CLS " in ascending order (select "Assessments" range, then 
Data/Sort/Column T, Smallest to Largest, no headers) to view the 
criterion/requirement sets that are both important and that strongly 
support a contracted resource strategy.  
The Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map is designed primarily for 
qualitative assessment and the identification of shared and differing impacts of a 
resource strategy on logistics support. Assessments are based on the perceptions 
and judgments of program team members about the program, logistics support 
resource strategy issues and their impacts. Those impacts can suggest information 
to develop that will improve resource strategy design, groupings of support 
requirements for effective and efficient acquisition, possible or beneficial 
evolutionary paths of support that indicate changes in government management 
needs, or alternative logistic support resource strategies. However, the Map also 
uses those assessments to calculate degrees of support for Contracted Logistics 
Support (and, by inference, lack of support for OLS) that can support strategy design 
choices. 
 
                                            
5  Hiding rows with values of zero may facilitate viewing and review.  
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Example Application of the Logistics Support 
Resource Strategy Map 
The use of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map will be illustrated 
with an application to the Predator A Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. See the attached 
tool as applied to the Predator A case and the following description of the application 
of the procedure above.  
Phase I: Create Criterion/Requirements Sets for Assessment 
Drew et al. (2005) provide a rich description of the Predator A program as it 
relates to logistics support (Step 1 in the Process for the Logistics Support Resource 
Strategy Map above). A brief summary is included in Appendix A. As described by 
Drew et al. (2005, p. 74),  
The Predator system consists of three elements—the air vehicle, the Ground 
Control Station (GCS), and the ground-based mission command and control 
station (CS). The GCS, which helps land and takeoff the air vehicle, is where 
the mission pilot is housed. The ground-based mission command and control 
station oversees the mission plan and its implementation, makes command 
decisions when needed, collects and disseminates the mission data, and 
interacts with higher Air Force echelons.  
For simplicity and economy, the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map 
was applied to the vehicle portion of the Predator system. Note that this choice by 
the authors implies two potentially important decisions in logistics support resource 
strategy design: 1) a disaggregation of the logistics support of the system into at 
least two parts, vehicle support and other support,6 and 2) the provision of all vehicle 
support with a single resource strategy (all organic, blended, or all contracted). 
These choices effectively perform Step 2 in the Process for the Logistics Support 
Resource Strategy Map above. Therefore, the description of the Logistics 
                                            
6  This choice at this point in the logistic support resource strategy design does not preclude adopting 
the same resource strategy for combinations of the vehicle, GCS, and CS.  
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Requirements for the example as being for “all,” refers only to the Predator A 
vehicle.  
 
Figure 5. Predator A 
(Drew et al., 2005) 
Predator A Vehicle Logistics Support Resource Drivers  
The Predator A program has a rich history. The portions that most strongly 
impacted the logistics support resourcing strategy for the vehicle are described here 
as the basis for illustrating the use of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map. 
See Appendix A of this study and Drew et al. (2005) for a more detailed description 
and analysis. The acquisition history of Predator A strongly influenced its logistics 
support resource strategy. Predator A was developed to fill a specific operational 
need for continuous Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ISR that was 
not being met. The program had strong support from multiple services, was in a 
rapid acquisition process (primarily bypassing the advanced development phase), 
and used accelerated production schedules to get units to the warfighters faster. The 
accelerated acquisition probably succeeded in delivering the product faster and 
reduced some oversight compared with traditional acquisition processes. However, it 
also imprinted the program with characteristics that impacted logistics support. 
Deployment occurred very quickly after successful testing. At that time, the 
developer was the only stakeholder knowledgeable enough about the vehicle to 
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provide logistics support. No organic personnel existed with the requisite knowledge 
and skill sets to provide logistics support. In addition, the developer had paid for 
most of the development and, therefore, had a large influence on the amounts and 
types of information gathered about the vehicle and owned most of the available 
data on vehicle performance.  
Program characteristics also impacted logistics in the Predator A case. 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) requirements and mission needs were dynamic 
during and after first deployment. The developer was generally successful in 
responding to these changes. But in doing so, the developer became the sole holder 
of critical product knowledge. In addition, a $5 million-per-vehicle cost limitation 
required extensive vehicle knowledge to make the retrofits and improvements for the 
increased capabilities common in high-technology, fast-development products. 
These could only be performed by the developer.  
DoD organizational issues also impacted Predator A logistics support 
resource strategy design. No Air Force specialty code exists that covers most of the 
Predator A’s needs, limiting the availability of organic logistics support personnel. 
Training was conducted at Indian Springs Air Force Station in Nevada at a remote 
location considered unattractive by some military personnel. Training took two years, 
leaving only one year of productive work in a traditional three-year rotation.   
Based on the available information on the program and its logistics, and using 
Step 3 above, the researchers considered 12 of the suggested possible criteria 
important in resource strategy design.  
 Quantity of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
 Quality of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
 OLS ability to provide required skills relative to CLS, 
 OLS availability of cross-trained personnel, 
 Availability/affordability of reliability and/or maintainability data to the 
DoD, 
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 Minimum fleet size & replacement rate required to maintain continuous 
logistics support, 
 Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats, 
 CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations, 
 OLS speed of deployment relative to CLS, 
 Risk of labor disputes,  
 Product immaturity (inverse of product maturity), and 
 Classification of program and its logistics support as a core 
competence or mission of the DoD. 
However, two important characteristics of the program that impacted logistics 
were not captured in the 12 criteria. The first was the impact of the $5 million-per-
vehicle cap on required knowledge for retrofits and improvements. The second was 
the flexibility of the developer (but not organic resources) to react quickly to 
changing CONOPs and missions. Therefore, (in accordance with Step 3 above) two 
additional criteria were added:  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to do upgrades within $5 million total-unit-cost 
cap, and 
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to react quickly to changing CONOPs and 
missions. 
Phase II: Assess Criterion/Requirement Set Needs in Logistics 
Support Resources   
The researchers assessed the importance of each of the resulting 14 criteria 
for designing the logistics support based on their understanding of the program 
(Step 4). For simplicity, we decided to use ordinal (integer) values to reflect the 
relative importance of criteria. Three criteria were considered most important and 
assigned the value one:  
 Quantity of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
 Quality of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS, 
and  
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 Product immaturity (inverse of product maturity). 
The first two criteria reflect the differences in the knowledge and specialized 
skills between the developer and the currently available organic logistics support 
work forces. Drew et al. (2005, p. 46) describe this difference as “The contractor 
work force comprises mostly skilled mechanics with exceptional knowledge of the air 
vehicle. By contrast, the Air Force does not hire highly skilled mechanics; it “raises” 
them,” which is typical of organic support resources.  The third criterion reflects the 
dynamic nature of the product and its requirements. The supporting information 
about the assessments of these criteria is captured in the “Reasoning behind 
assessment” cell for each criterion. Interestingly, this criterion and the two that were 
added are different criteria types—with product immaturity describing a product 
characteristic and reaction times measuring labor resources. This difference can 
facilitate identifying different logistics-support and risk-mitigation strategies.   
Three of the criteria were assessed to be important but not as important as 
those above; they are assigned a value of two, followed by supporting notes from 
their “Reasoning behind assessment” cells:  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to react quickly to changing CONOPs and 
missions—NEW CRITERIA ADDED 
 OLS ability to provide required skills relative to CLS—No trained OLS 
staff 
 Program and its logistics support are classified as a core competency 
or mission of the DoD—Fills critical ISR need. Expanded to strike 
capability. Strong command support for the program. 
Two of the criteria were assessed to be next in importance and assigned a 
value of three, followed by supporting notes from their “Reasoning behind 
assessment” cells:  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to do upgrades within $5 million total-unit-cost 
cap—Cap hinders retrofits (even to improve capabilities). Requires 
intimate vehicle knowledge to constrain retrofit cost.  
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 Availability/affordability of reliability and/or maintainability data to the 
DoD—Developer paid for most of development. Not 
developed/available. 
Similarly, the remaining criteria were assessed the following importance 
values, followed by supporting notes:  
 Minimum fleet size & replacement rate required to maintain continuous 
logistics support—4. Current fleet of 100 supports CLS. Fleet expected 
to grow 12+ vehicles/yr. 
 Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats—5. Forward sites 
require logistics support for takeoff, etc. 
 OLS speed of deployment relative to CLS—5. None. 
 CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations—6. Slight 
advantage to CLS, see Drew et al. study).  
 Risk of labor disputes—7. No indication of a risk but could become 
one. 
 OLS availability of cross-trained personnel—8. None. 
Each of the 14 criterion were then assessed for the ability of organic support 
to fulfill the criteria (Step 5) from “Very High” (value=0) to “Very Low” (value=10). 
Those assessments were then quantified with the selection of a degree in the 
spreadsheet (Step 6). These assessments were facilitated by the deep reflection of 
logistics issues required to perform the previous five steps. The quantified 
assessments were:  
 Quantity of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to 
CLS—10 
 Quality of OLS logistics support operations labor pool relative to CLS—
10 
 OLS ability to provide required skills relative to CLS—10  
 Ability of OLS vs. CLS to react quickly to changing CONOPs and 
missions—10  
 OLS availability of cross-trained personnel—9  
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 Availability/affordability of reliability and/or maintainability data to the 
DoD—8 
 Minimum fleet size & replacement rate required to maintain continuous 
logistics support—8 
 Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats—8 
 Ability to OLS vs. CLS to do upgrades within $5 million total-unit-cost 
cap—8 
 CLS unit cost to provide logistics support operations—6  
 OLS speed of deployment relative to CLS—5  
 Risk of labor disputes—5  
 Product immaturity (inverse of product maturity)—1  
 Program and its logistics support are classified as a core competence 
or mission of the DoD—1  
The degree of support for each criterion was assessed in isolation, as if the 
other criteria did not influence the assessment. For example, high product immaturity 
alone suggests the use of organic support based partially on the reasoning that the 
many changes require a deep understanding of and sensitivity to requirements and 
users, which organic support is more likely to be able to provide. But this 
assessment might shift more toward support of contracted support if the difference in 
product knowledge of organic and contracted support resources is incorporated into 
the assessment of the product immaturity.  
Phase III: Review, Discuss, and Revise Assessments from 
Different Perspectives  
The researchers then reviewed the assessment using the Map. To review the 
criteria assessed to be most important (Step 7), we sorted the criteria in ascending 
order of “Importance of Criteria.” Our review of these criteria indicated that the 
quantity and quality of logistics support labor available are very important in the 
assessment, which is consistent with the hard requirement for very knowledgeable 
and specialized vehicle support. This review provided an opportunity to test the 
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fidelity of the program as described in the Map, improve that fidelity, and build 
confidence in the Map’s usefulness.  
We then reviewed the assessment based on the degree of support for the use 
of contracted logistics support (Step 8); we did this by sorting the criteria in 
descending order based on the “Degree of Support for CLS.” This review revealed 
that two of the three most important criteria and one of the criteria rated with an 
importance of two were assessed with the maximum degree of support for the use of 
contracted resources. This suggests that contracted logistics support may be the 
best strategy for the Predator A vehicle.  
Finally, we reviewed the description of the drivers of a contracted strategy 
(Step 9) by sorting the criteria in descending order based on the “Priority-weighed 
degree of Support for CLS.” Comparing this review with the previous one revealed 
that the top four criteria do not change; this consistency suggests that relative 
influence of the criteria on a design does not alter the suggested design based solely 
on support for organic or contracted resources. The fifth criterion, if support for CLS 
is the basis (Vulnerability of CLS personnel to battlefield threats), moves four places 
lower when importance is included in the assessment, suggesting that although this 
criterion suggests the use of contracted resources, it should have significantly less 
influence than other criteria.  
 
 - 33 - 
Tool Evaluation and Implications for Practice 
The Map and its methodology for its use have several advantages as a tool 
for facilitating logistics support resource strategy design. These include:   
 Provide framework for assessment by providing structure of criteria 
and assessment methodology; 
 Provide support for improved assessment criteria identification 
due to the extensive list of possible criteria; 
 Provide support for improved assessment quality due to increased 
specification of criteria, focusing of assessment on organic, blended, 
and contracted resources, and signaling (with differing assessments) 
where more in-depth investigation may be needed; 
 Provide flexibility for adaptation to many different types of programs 
and products; 
 High ease of use due to basis in the widely used Excel® spreadsheet 
application; 
 High ease of understanding by users due to its transparency (no 
hidden or locked cells or complex equations); and 
 Provides documentation of both assessments and reasoning behind 
those assessments which can be used to support logistics support 
resource strategy designs in program reviews.  
The Map and the methodology for its use also have weaknesses, including:  
 Illusion of objectivity based on its use of a computer format, although 
assessments remain based on the judgments of the program team;  
 Lack of internal checks and balances; the Map and methodology 
have no way of identifying if criteria have been overlooked, ignored, or 
assessed incorrectly.  
The use of the Map by program teams can significantly improve logistics 
support resource strategy design processes through the advantages identified 
above. The Map can also improve program reviews by providing structured and 
clear documentation of the evaluation process used to design logistics support 
resource strategies. This documentation will allow easier and faster review, 
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improvement, and approval of DoD programs. Doing so may help program teams to 
better manage the major acquisition challenge of logistics support resource strategy 
design.  
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Conclusions  
The current research extends previous research on the costs of logistics 
support resource strategies by modeling the impacts of programs, environments, 
and strategies on resourcing with organic, blended, or contracted resources. The 
structure of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map and methodology for its 
use are designed for ease of understanding and adaptation by users. The Map and 
methodology were initially tested by application to the vehicle portion of the Predator 
A unmanned aerial vehicle system. This test indicated that the Map and its 
methodology can significantly improve logistics support resource strategy design 
and can facilitate managing program reviews by documenting a program team’s 
assessment of the relative importance of specific program, environment, and 
strategy features and characteristics as they relate to logistics support resource 
strategy design and by focusing team assessments on resource design. However, 
the test also revealed that the successful use of the Map and its methodology is 
dependent on the deep reflection and evaluation of program team members. 
Additional validation and verification of the Map is needed to increase the confidence 
for its use in practice. This can be done by applying the Map to other DoD programs 
and by improving the Map and its methodology based on those tests.  
As discussed above, the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map is founded 
on the assessments of the program team. Poor or inadequately supported 
observations and assessments will generate poor results (i.e., garbage in—garbage 
out). Sensitivity tests by subject-matter experts can be used to improve user 
understanding of the impacts of different importance and assessment values on 
results. The results of such analyses can improve the Map’s usefulness.  
The Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map may improve DoD acquisition 
by improving logistics support resource design. In combination with other acquisition 
tools and methods, the Map can significantly improve program performance and 
reduce costs. The continued development and use of this and other tools for 
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managing the acquisition process will provide better materiel to warfighters faster for 
less cost.  
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Appendix A. Predator A Program Description as It 
Relates to Logistics Support  
(taken primarily from Drew et al., 2005) 
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle is an offspring of an Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program run by DARPA. Because survivability at 
these altitudes was thought to be questionable (the UAV was not to be stealthy), the 
unit cost of the vehicle had to be such that it could be viewed as expendable. The 
resulting unit cost cap was set at $5 million. Predator was first used in an operational 
context in Bosnia in July 1995, where it proved its operational utility. The resulting 
enthusiasm for rapidly fielding Predator led to a decision to forgo the normal 
acquisition approach and simply to make modifications to the vehicle as technology 
and money allowed. As a result, many of the normal activities associated with formal 
engineering development activity (now called SDD) did not occur. Among these 
were the lack of data, tools, and planning for long-term support of Predator. 
Moreover, the resulting financing did not allow the Air Force to redress some of 
these shortfalls, in part because the original cost cap of $5 million per plane was still 
in place.  
The Predator System 
The Predator system consists of three elements—the air vehicle, the Ground Control 
Station (GCS), and the ground-based mission command-and-control station (CS). 
The GCS, which helps the air vehicle land and take off, is where the mission pilot is 
housed. The ground-based mission command-and-control station oversees the 
mission plan and its implementation, makes command decisions when needed, 
collects and disseminates the mission data, and interacts with higher Air Force 
echelons.  
The Air Vehicle 
Predator A weighs about 2,250 lbs., has a wingspan of about 49 ft., and is powered 
by an internal-combustion engine adapted from a snowmobile motor. Predator A’s 
relatively slow cruise speed hinders its ability to operate from a base that is more 
than 500 nmi from the desired target area. But its simple operation allows it to 
operate off very austere bases, enabling a reasonable number of basing options that 
are within flying range. The vehicle and all of its parts are designed to be easily 
transported in a C-130, which also can fly into and out of austere bases. 
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Predator A in Flight 
The Ground Stations 
Predator has both a forward-based GCS and a mission control station (CS). 
Originally, the GCS was housed in a large 40-ft trailer. However, it was determined 
that all that is needed at the remote forward location are the pilot stations. The trailer 
was abandoned, leaving a much smaller enclosure with just the pilot workstations. 
The ancillary equipment (for example, power generator) were also reduced in size, 
and the number of people located forward—the pilots and the personnel needed to 
support the vehicle and the GCS—became minimal. The GCS is designed to be 
readily deployable to austere sites that have little or no supporting infrastructure. 
Thus, it has been designed to be minimal in its capabilities and support needs, and 
is sufficiently small to permit deployment by small transport aircraft capable of 
landing at austere locations. The GCS plays a direct role in landings and takeoffs of 
the air vehicle and passes instructions to the vehicle while it is in flight. The GCS 
consists of two pilot stations, each with a joystick for piloting the vehicle, and a 
couple of displays that show the vehicle’s status and flight-related data essential for 
successfully piloting the air vehicle. The GCS also has a direct LOS communication 
antenna and a larger antenna for communication to the vehicle via satellite relay. 
The LOS communications link is essential for piloting the vehicle when it is landing 
or taking off. Sending vehicle flight data to the GCS by means of a satellite relay 
would delay the pilot’s reaction time—making it insufficient to make corrective 
maneuver instructions to save the vehicle under a number of realistic scenarios.  
The BLOS communication link allows the GCS to fly the vehicle when it is 
performing its mission functions. The sensitivity of successfully flying the air vehicle  
to the time delay is much less if the vehicle is at altitude. The pilot has substantial 
time to detect the problem and make the corrective control instructions. The GCS 
also has a deployable differential GPS unit for providing precision landing data to 
Predator and the GCS. The mission CS is considerably larger. It consists of a large 
40-foot trailer, a power generator, an air-conditioning unit, and a set of antennas 
(one being a 6-m antenna that receives the video data from the Predator). The CS 
needs external inputs to aid in situational awareness. These include information on 
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target areas of interest from warfighting commanders as well as potentially 
dangerous areas where Predator might come under attack. When Predator is on 
station, targets of opportunity may arise, causing changes in Predator’s mission 
plan. These may be handled exclusively by the CS or could involve consultation and 
coordination with the upper command echelons. 
Deployment 
Predator is routinely deployed from the United States to a forward location to 
perform its mission. Predator’s main CONUS home base is Indian Springs Air Force 
Station, Nevada. The entire deployment package consists of the following: air 
vehicles; the GCS (and perhaps the CS); various ground-based antennas for 
communications to and from the air vehicle and between the GCS and CS; 
equipment for a differential GPS at the site; maintenance equipment (including spare 
parts); and personnel to operate the air vehicle, maintain it, and manage the base 
(for example, prepare food and provide security). For deployment, Predator’s wings 
are removed, and the entire vehicle is put into a box for transporting to the desired 
location. Assembling or disassembling Predator’s wings is simple, involving the 
removal of two connectors that hold the wings in place after they have been inserted 
into the fuselage. Because of the different missions Predator performs, and the 
potential for encountering icing conditions, each vehicle has multiple wings (for 
example, with and without weapon attachments, with and without de-icing 
capabilities). These wing kits give the mission planner the widest set of options for 
employing Predator’s capabilities. The entire deployment package is airlifted to its 
planned forward operating location. The deployment package consists of two pallets 
that fit within a single C-130. The total size of the deployment might vary, with four 
air vehicle sets being the nominal for continuous operation (three to provide 
continuous coverage and a fourth as a spare in case of a vehicle loss). Planning 
calls for no more than 24 hours for deployment preparation and for 24 hours to 
achieve active status once reaching the deployment site. The deployment site is 
usually a remote site, away from any major air base, and is, at best, sparsely 
provisioned. Predator deployment means bringing essentially everything required for 
30 days of operation. Moreover, Predator relies almost exclusively on continuing 
airlift support during the employment phase, as access to suitable ground 
transportation is not always possible.  
At least in part because Predator is essentially hand-built, it has proven to be easily 
modified. For example, adding a Hellfire missile to its wings was quickly 
accomplished, along with suitable software for weapon employment. A laser 
designator was added to the mission ball, along with a laser tracker and the ability to 
track moving targets.  
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Survivability 
The primary survivability measure available to Predator A is avoidance. This tactic 
requires good intelligence on the vehicle’s location and flexible mission planning that 
provides safe routes to and from the target area of interest. Predator can also fly at 
altitudes where most IR SAM threats have poor performance and where ground-to-
air artillery threats are minimal. Nevertheless, it is expected that modern SAMs will 
eventually be acquired by countries hostile to the United States (including those in 
the Third World). When this happens, Predator A will face higher attrition rates. This 
will negatively affect the number of the Predators needed to perform the mission. 
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Appendix B. Logistics Support Resource Strategy 
Map 
The below illustrates contents of the authors’ logistics support analysis tool, 
the Logistics Support Resource Strategy Map. This Excel®-based decision aid 
facilitates the strategy selection process and available from the authors directly. 
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Appendix C. Logistics Support Resource Strategy 
Map as it Might be Applied to the Predator A 
Program 
The below illustrates application of the Logistics Support Resource Strategy 
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